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pose, it is said that a full pardon gives a new character to the person
convicted and re-establishes his credibility as a witness.' 8 The jurisdictions which do not admit a pardon to rehabilitate an impeached
witness, say that unless the pardon expressly states that it is based
upon a finding of innocence, it throws no new light upon a witness'
credibility.19
It is submitted that the better solution to this problem of rehabilitation by explanation of a conviction would be to give the trial judge
considerable discretionary powers.20 To attempt to state a rule which
will meet and satisfy the many situations herein mentioned would be
an almost insurmountable task. The trial judge is aware of the situation which is present in the case before him, and he can best determine
the solution to that problem. He is better able to observe the counsels
and witnesses, and also to evaluate the effect of their actions on the
jury. Lastly, the trial judge is the one best able to determine the
extent, if any, of diverting the court from the real issue of the case.
GEoRGE

B. BAEN, JR.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAWSTATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE
The City of Chicago, by ordinance, imposed a "license tax" on
trucks operated "within the city" for hire. The tax was graduated
according to the size of the trucks, ranging from $8.25 on a truck of
no more than two ton capacity to $16.50 on a truck of four ton capacity or more.' Respondent, an Illinois corporation, with its place
of business in Chicago, owned a fleet of trucks which it employed
to transport goods within Chicago, and between Chicago and points
in other states. One truck often made both intrastate and interstate
sBryant v. U.S., 257 F. 378 (5th Cir. 1919).
S4 WIGMORP, EVIDENCE sec. 1116 (3) (1940).
'U.S. v. Boyer, 150 F. 2d 595 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
"Everyck
ck ... which shall be operated... for the purpose of transporting ... goods . . within the city for hire or reward shall be deemed a cart
"Any person engaged in the business of operating a cart shall be deemed a

carter.
"An annual license tax is imposed upon every carter for each cart operated
or controlled by him, according to the following schedule:
"Automotive vehiclesCapacity not exceeding two tons .............................................
$ 8.25
Capacity exceeding two but not exceeding three tons ....................
11.00
Capacity exceeding three but not exceeding four tons ....................
13.20
Capacity exceeding four tons ...............................................
16.50"
Municipal Code of Chicago, Ch. 163 (January 14, 1949).

NOTS .NDCOMMENTS

deliveries. Chicago applied the tax to respondent's trucks which carried intrastate and interstate commerce inseparably commingled. The
Supreme Court of Illinois held that the tax was an unconstitutional
burden upon interstate commerce, as applied to respondents trucks,
because it could not separate its loads nor could it discontinue any
part of the service. 2 On certiorari, the judgment was reversed.3
The Court held that no showing was made that the tax burdened
interstate commerce, and it was "clearly unassailable" under the authority of People ex rel New York Central & H. R. Co. v. Miller,4 and
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota.5 In the Miller case the Court
had sustained a franchise tax6 on a domestic corporation computed
upon the basis of the whole of its capital stock employed within the
state, including a considerable proportion of its cars which were
almost continuously out of the state. On this ground, it was contended
that this proportion should be deducted from its entire capital. The
tax was sustained on the basis that a state may tax its own corporations for all their property within the State at any time during the
tax year, even if every item of that property should be taken successively into another state for a day, a week, or six months. This
decision was held to be controlling by the majority opinion in the
Northwest Airlines case. There the taxpayer, a Minnesota corporation,
used St. Paul as the "home port" for all its planes. The rebuilding and
overhauling was done in St. Paul. Minnesota assessed its general
personal property tax against the airline on the basis of the entire
fleet. The Supreme Court sustained the tax as satisfying both the
commerce clause and due process requirements. Mr. Justice Frankfurter announced the conclusion and judgment of the court and delivered an opinion to the effect that Minnesota, by virtue of its "predominant contacts" with the planes, i.e., as both the domiciliary state
and the locus of its main place of business, had the right to levy such
a tax, since none of the planes, due to their transitory nature, had
acquired a permanent taxing situs elsewhere, and all were in Minnesota at some time during the tax year.
Although the tax in the principle case is not clearly a property
tax, the Court frequently relies on the property tax as an analogy
when other types of taxes touching interstate commerce are chal2Chicago v. Willett Co., 409 IMI.480, 101 N. E. 2d 205 (1951). The Court
cited Osborne v. Florida, 164 U. S. 650 (1896) and Pullman Co. v. Adams, 189
U. S. 420 (1903). These cases held in effect that only when a separation, in fact,
of intrastate and interstate business exists can a like seperation be recognized of
the power of a state to tax.
Chicago v. Willett Co., 344 U. S. 574 (1953).
'202 U. S. 584 (1906).
-322 U. S. 292 (1944).
'Although this was a franchise tax on all property employed within the state,
the court treated the exaction as a property tax.
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lenged. 7 Together the cited cases might suggest that the domiciliary
state has a somewhat larger latitude to tax, but it is not clear that the
Court intended to limit power to tax to the state of incorporation.
In the principal case, Chicago, Illinois, was the corporation's domicile, but the case, if carried to its logical limits, affords an avenue by
which interstate operations of both foreign and local corporations
could be reached by a local tax. One of the grounds on which the
majority sustained the tax, over commerce clause objections, was that
the taxing jurisdiction was the "business home" of the taxed corporation and furnished protection to the taxpayer. Here the interstate
business, by increasing the number of trucks operated by the taxpayer, increased the amount of the tax. Interstate business under this
theory, was reflected in the tax. It was for that reason that Mr. Justice
Douglas dissented, and stated that this was an "occupational tax" for
the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce and invalid under
the rule of Sprout v. City Of South Bend," and Spector Motor Service
Inc. v. O'Connor.9 In the Spector case Connecticut imposed its franchise tax on a foreign corporation. The tax was measured by that part
of the carrier's net income reasonably attributable to activities within
' No mention was made in the principal case of Ott v. Mississippi Valley
Barge Line Co., 336 U. S. 169 (1949). This case gave a considerably different
complex to the former rules governing the taxation of watercraft. For the past
eighty years the rule was that only the state in which the owner of the vessel is
domiciled had power to tax, St. Louis v. The Ferry Co., 11 Wall 423 (U. S. 1870),
unless the vessel acquires an actual situs elsewhere, Old Dominion Steamship Co.
v. Virginia, 198 U. S. 299 (1905). In Ott, an ad valorem tax on a barge line of
a foreign corporation operating interstate on inland waters in the taxing state was
sustained when there was an apportionment under a formula like that used for
taxing rolling stock of interstate railroads. Although the taxing state was not the
domicile of the barge company, the tax was upheld over both due process and
commerce clause objections. That vessels moving in interstate operations, certainly in inland waters, are now taxable by the same standards as those applied
to railroads used in interstate commerce is further shown by the recent case of
Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U. S. 382 (1952). There we find a corollary of the
rationale of the Ott opinion. The domiciliary state of Standard Oil was not permitted to tax the whole value of its crafts used in interstate transportation of oil,
since they were subject to taxation on an apportionment basis in several other
states where they operated. The taxation of all of Standard Oil's boats and barges
by the state of the domicile was prohibited by the due process clause as multiple
taxation of interstate operations. There was no showing in Standard Oil that other
states had taxed the barges in question, but the court decided that the mere
existence of the power to do so limits the state of domicile to its proportionate
share of the value. Thus, it would seem that the actual effect of the present decision is either to over-rule the Northwest Airlines case or to acknowledge that
two rules are now in operation: as to airplanes and inland vessels. No distinction
seems apparent between the two, and the Standard Oil decision may indicate that
the court has withdrawn from its position in the Northwest Airlines case that the
domiciliary state has the power to impose property tax on all the property of the
m , STATE TAxATION OF INTERSTATE CosMrancE 91
corporation. See HIfRf
(1953).
8277 U. S.163 (1928).
9340 U. S. 602 (1951).
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the state, but was deemed a levy on the privilege of doing interstate
business and held invalid without regard to its amount, computation,
or economic effect. The Court declared the tax was invalid no matter
how fairly it was apportioned to business done within the state, in
literal application of the long-established rule that even the state of
the domicile may not impose a tax on the very privilege of engaging
10
in interstate commerce.
In the Willett case, two members of the Court, while concurring
in the conclusion that the tax was valid, would have nothing to do
with the "business home" basis for upholding tax because it does
intrastate business on the streets of Chicago. Neither the fact that it
is an Illinois corporation, nor the fact that its trucks are sometimes
out of the state was regarded as controlling. If the concurring opinion
has any meaning, it is that the majority thought that the city could
levy a tax on some basis other than for use of the streets. The majority
opinion reenforces this impression by declaring that:
[Respondents business] . . . is fed by terminals for rail and sea
transportation which the City provides. It receives, much more continuously than did the airline in the Northwest Airlines case or the
railroad in the Miller case, the City's protection, and its benefits
from the City's public services. 11
Under the "business home" approach used by the majority, even
a foreign corporation doing business that is exclusively interstate
could have a "business home" for local tax purposes. But that approach apparently conflicts with the Spector case and earlier decisions
denying the right to impose a franchise tax on foreign corporations
engaged exclusively in interstate commerce. Has the Court modified
this long established doctrine? Since the same tax in the Spector
Motor Co. case would have been sustained if levied as compensation
for use of the state highways, 12 it seems that undue weight was accorded the label. Thus, if the tax is an "occupational tax" levied on the
privilege of engaging in interstate commerce as Justice Douglas in his
dissant contends, it might be concluded that the Court has changed
its position from the "label approach" to one of "economic effect," and
will therefore uphold such a tax if it does not put an unreasonable
burden on interstate commerce.
What seems to be established by the principal case is that a state
may require payment of a tax for the privilege of engaging in a local
phAlpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U. S. 203 (1925); Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaners, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U. S. 389 (1952).
' Supra note 3 at 580.

"See Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of Railroad Commissioners of
Montana, 832 U. S. 495 (1947); Bode v. Barrett, 344 U. S. 583 (1953).

818.
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business or occupation, although mingled with interstate business,
when no showing is made that the tax burdens interstate commerce.
Whether it likewise opens the doors under the "business home" theory
for local transportation centers to tax wholly interstate business because their "business home," is located there, is a question which remains unanswered at this time.
Wmuriv C. BRAF'Foiw, JR.

